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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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               FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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     CLAUDETTE DELEON,
               Plaintiff
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                                         No. 05-126E
          v.
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     CRAWFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
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     DISTRICT,
               Defendant
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               Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in the
 9
          above-captioned matter held on Tuesday, October
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          11, 2005, commencing at 2:19 p.m., before the
          Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin, at the United States
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          Courthouse, Courtroom C, 617 State Street, Erie,
          Pennsylvania 16501.
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     For the Plaintiff:
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          Caleb L. Nichols, Esquire
          P.O. Box 1585
18
          Erie, PA 16507
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     For the Defendant:
          Roberta Binder Heath, Esquire
21
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          Altoona, PA 16603-1311
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                  Reported by Janis L. Ferguson, RPR
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THE COURT: Good afternoon. Ms. Heath? 1 MS. HEATH: Your Honor, last time we were before 2 3 you in this action, we had a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 4 Complaint, and you entered an order from the bench relative 5 to permitting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the 6 Complaint. 7 And there are particular issues that remain in play, and -- there are four issues, actually. And of 8 9 those four, we filed a Motion to Dismiss on two of those 10 issues, so it is a partial Motion to Dismiss, as you indicated. 11 12 The first is a failure to exhaust 13 administrative remedies. And I had filed with the Court a supplemental memorandum, because I anticipated Plaintiff's 14 15 attempting to argue an equitable tooling of the statute 16 relative to filing the PHRC Complaint --17 THE COURT: Let me ask you just a couple 18 background questions to make sure that we're on the same factual page. 19 As I understand it, the Plaintiff would have 20 21 been terminated -- was it August of 2003? 22 MS. HEATH: Yes. Yes. 23 THE COURT: But sometime, some months prior to 24 that, she was suspended. Is that correct? 25 MS. HEATH: Correct.

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THE COURT: And there's no dispute, at least in
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     your view, that she filed a Complaint with the EEOC --
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               MS. HEATH: March 23rd of 2003.
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               THE COURT: Apropos to her suspension?
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               MS. HEATH: That is correct.
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               THE COURT: And to put a fine point on it, insofar
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     as the exhaustion issue is concerned, your contention is
     that you have looked in vain, and you have not found, nor
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     have you been supplied what you characterize as an Amended
     Complaint complaining of the termination. Is that correct?
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               MS. HEATH: Or any Complaint complaining of the
     termination. Nothing has been filed.
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               THE COURT: All right. Well --
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               MS. HEATH: Or served.
               THE COURT: All right. Well, there is
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     correspondence that was attached -- I don't know if you
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     attached it or he attached it, but I read it -- wherein a
     representative of the EEOC, whose name is presently name
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     escaping me --
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                          Mr. Flipping.
               MS. HEATH:
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               MR. NICHOLS: Flipping.
               THE COURT: Yes. -- references her termination.
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     Isn't it reasonable to -- now, I'm speculating, because
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     there's been no record available. But doesn't it look like
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     the EEOC investigated this from a termination standpoint;
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whatever you call it?

MS. HEATH: There had been some attempts at discussion concerning a settlement, and the PHRC investigator was indicating that he mentioned the correspondence indicates the dismissal. But it has always been the School District's contention, and continues to be, is because she never filed an Amended Complaint, dismissal was never an issue that was going to be discussed for potential settlement with the PHRC.

THE COURT: When I said EEOC, maybe I meant PHRC. But before there was an attempt to mediate or resolve this, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, I guess -- but do you know or does -- do you personally know, or does the record here reflect the extent to which the PHRC had actually began its investigation and conducted any investigation?

MS. HEATH: No. And, in fact, there were no documents. From what I have -- I was not involved at that level, but in reviewing the file, there were no requests for documents or anything of that nature from the PHRC relative to the dismissal, which would be indicative of a formal investigation.

THE COURT: All right. And I don't know what more we can say on that. I get your point. And then isn't there -- if I remember correctly, there's a contention with respect to the 1981 claim?

MS. HEATH: And the 1983. 1 2 THE COURT: And the 1983 claim? MS. HEATH: That's correct. 3 4 THE COURT: There's not enough said about the individual Defendant's personal involvement? 5 6 MS. HEATH: And I think the Rode -- the Third 7 Circuit decision that I cited, which continues to be cited, despite there's been subsequent Supreme Court cases 8 9 concerning --10 (Proceedings interrupted by reporter.) 11 (Discussion held off the record.) MS. HEATH: The Rode case, R-O-D-E, is still good 12 13 law relative to individual liability arguments. And I said 14 despite the fact there has been a Supreme Court decision, a 15 Sorema decision relative to there is no heightened standard 16 of pleading employment law cases versus other federal cases, 17 nonetheless, this Rode case continues to be cited. And in 18 particular, Section 1983 does not impose any liability under respondeat superior theory. So, in other words, there has 19 20 to be some specific pleading of personal involvement. 21 In the Boykins versus Ambridge Area School 22 District case, which is a Third Circuit 1980 case, they 23 upheld individual liability under Section 1983 because 24 particular times, places, and events were all pled and 25 separated out as the actor not being an agent of the

employer, but acting on his own. 1 2 Similarly, they argue that the Section 1981 3 claim, again, there has to be some sort of a personal action 4 or personal involvement so as to have the civil rights 5 remedy under Section 1981 and for personal liability to 6 attach. 7 THE COURT: All right. Thanks. MS. HEATH: 8 Thank you. 9 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Nichols, come on up. 10 MR. NICHOLS: Judge --11 THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on. Now, you know how I start asking questions first. Otherwise, we'll 12 13 get all over the place. Then I'm going to let you talk. 14 But I want to ask some preliminary questions. Now, what I'm talking about is the exhaustion 15 16 issue, insofar as it relates to the termination claim. 17 first question is, was there a Complaint filed with the PHRC or the EEOC relative to her complaining about discriminatory 18 treatment relative to her termination? 19 20 MR. NICHOLS: In sum and substance, there was --21 the PHRC was put on notice. In particular --22 THE COURT: How did that happen? 23 MR. NICHOLS: In particular, my client, whose testimony I can put on, if necessary --24 25 THE COURT: No.

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MR. NICHOLS: -- went -- she went to the PHRC, and
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     she carried with her a portfolio.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. NICHOLS: She met with Mr. Flipping.
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               THE COURT: What is his name again? I'm sorry.
              MR. NICHOLS: Mr. Flipping.
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               THE COURT: Can you spell it.
              MR. NICHOLS: F-L-I-P-P-I-N-G. He is a
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     representative of the PHRC. She met with him. She
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     discussed the nature of the problem. And then there was
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     subsequent correspondence in front of the Judge. All of
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     that, you see the substance involves her dismissal. As a
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     matter of fact, they indicate -- Mr. Flipping acknowledging
     some -- in one of the letters -- which I would provide the
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     Court with -- that there was -- he referred specifically to
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     dismissal.
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                   Now, you can quibble whether it's dismissal
     or terminate. I don't think it's helpful. You quibble over
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     words like that. You're trying to make a difference by
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     distinction.
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               THE COURT: No. No. I'm sorry.
                                                 That's -- the
     quibbling isn't between the word "dismissal" and
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     "termination". The quibbling is between the word
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     "termination" and "suspension". They are two distinct
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     things. Right?
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MR. NICHOLS: Judge, I will let the record speak
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     for itself. As I said --
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               THE COURT: What would Mr. Flipping -- if
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    Mr. Flipping were deposed -- in other words, what do you
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     believe he would say that would inform my decision as to
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     whether the PHRC was on notice of this claim and was
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     actively grappling with it, with the termination issue?
               MR. NICHOLS: I have talked to Mr. Flipping by
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     telephone myself. I can represent that to the Court.
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               THE COURT: All right.
              MR. NICHOLS: I believe that he would testify,
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     one, that my client came in concerning -- after the
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     suspension, after she had been terminated, dismissed,
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     April of 2003.
               THE COURT: Now, wait. Excuse me. You know,
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     precision is important, Mr. Nichols.
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               MR. NICHOLS: I understand.
               THE COURT: And you said after she was terminated
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     in April 2003. She had not been terminated as of
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     April 2003. She had been suspended.
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               MR. NICHOLS: No, Judge, please. Please.
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     a letter. I have a letter --
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               THE COURT: Maybe --
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               MR. NICHOLS: I have a letter --
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               THE COURT: You know, I can tell you something.
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You've got to wait until I finish speaking.
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               MR. NICHOLS: All right, Judge.
               THE COURT: That's the rule.
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               MR. NICHOLS: I understand. I understand.
               THE COURT: And it isn't so much for me; it's for
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     that lady there, who can't get down what we're saying.
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                    What was the date of your client's
     suspension, first of all? What date was she suspended?
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               MR. NICHOLS: Excuse me, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.
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               (Discussion held off the record.)
               MR. NICHOLS: Judge, my client informs me that she
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     was suspended March 2003. And then following that, in
     April 2004 --
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               THE COURT: No, wait. No. It's April 2003.
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              MR. NICHOLS: 2003. Correct. Correct.
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               THE COURT: Then she got a letter terminating her.
              MR. NICHOLS: Terminating her.
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               THE COURT: All right. So we've got that sequence
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     down.
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               MR. NICHOLS: Right.
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               THE COURT: So getting back to this again, what
     would Mr. Flipping's -- what offer of proof can you give me
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     that if Mr. Flipping were to testify, he would indicate that
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     the PH -- he's with the PHRC.
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MR. NICHOLS: That's right. He's a 1 2 representative. 3 That he was aware that your client was THE COURT: 4 complaining about termination -- not just the suspension, 5 but the termination? What would he say about that? MR. NICHOLS: My understanding is that she 6 7 carried -- my client carried to him, physically carried to him in his office in Pittsburgh, PHRC office, a portfolio 8 which included -- and that included all of the 9 10 correspondence, as well as the correspondence dealing with her termination. 11 THE COURT: Would this meeting have occurred after 12 13 termination? (Discussion held off the record.) 14 THE COURT: I heard from the background that she 15 16 sent the letter around May 2nd and subsequently met with him 17 after that. Is that right? 18 MR. NICHOLS: That's right, Judge. THE COURT: All right. What do you want to say 19 20 about the other point; about the alleged inadequacy of your 21 pleading under 1981 and 1983? 22 MR. NICHOLS: Well, I read the -- I read your 23 ruling again. I thought you had ruled on the 1981 claim as 24 being adequate. That was my understanding, as I read the 25 decision.

THE COURT: All right. If the 1981 claim is 1 2 adequate, then presumably the 1983 claim is adequate for 3 pleading purposes. 4 MR. NICHOLS: That's what I read. I mean, I have 5 a copy of the decision. 6 THE COURT: I know. I know what I -- you needn't 7 I read it before it came out. pull it out. All right, thank you. You can sit down. 8 (Discussion held off the record.) 9 THE COURT: Presently pending before the Court is 10 11 a Motion to Dismiss brought on behalf of the Defendant. 12 By way of background, the Plaintiff has filed 13 an Amended Complaint in response to this Court's previous order of August 9. First, the Defendant moves to dismiss 14 15 the Plaintiff's claim based upon her termination which 16 occurred in April of 2003. And specifically the Defendant 17 contends the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her 18 administrative remedies by filing a timely Complaint with either the PHRC or the EEOC relative to her termination. 19 20 Parenthetically, it is apparently undisputed 21 that she did file a claim relative to her suspension, which 22 occurred several weeks before her termination. Of course, a 23 timely EEOC Complaint must be filed within 300 days of the 24 alleged discriminatory event and within 180 days for 25 purposes of PHRC.

In response, Plaintiff attaches various 1 letters wherein the Plaintiff's dismissal is mentioned by 2 Mr. Flipping of the PHRC. She claims that counsel -- that 3 4 Mr. Flipping would testify that PHRC was put on notice of 5 the termination claim by virtue of a group of documents 6 supplied by the Plaintiff and/or through her personal 7 meeting with him, and then in that sense, the PHRC was considering, as an aspect of her claim, the termination 8 9 aspect of it. In my view, the record at this point is not 10 11 sufficiently developed to resolve the exhausting issue as a 12 matter of law. Consequently, that aspect of the motion is 13 denied to permit further record development insofar as it might relate to issues of tolling, estoppel, et cetera. 14 Finally with respect to the 1981 and 1983 15 16 claims, I have reviewed them against the standard of Rode 17 versus DeleCarte, and I find that for pleading purposes, 18 they are sufficient. So the Defendant's motion is denied. (Discussion held off the record.) 19 20 (Whereupon he following discussion was held on the 21 record in camera:) 22 THE COURT: The Motion to Dismiss having been 23 denied, it's now time to get your answer filed. I don't 24 want to see another motion filed. And I'm not being 25 critical, but it's time to get the answer and get it in

timely within the regular time period. We will then, in due course, schedule this for a status conference. We'll give you a discovery schedule, which is likely going to be my standard 120 days. And as I said before, you have a standing offer here, if you both choose and your clients are so inclined to have me mediate a settlement conference at some point. All right? MS. HEATH: Thank you. (Hearing concluded at 1:58 p.m.)